The US finger on China's pulse

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SPEAKING FREELY
The US finger on China's pulse
By Richard Seldin
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.
WASHINGTON - With the exceptions of the Iraq war and the fight against terrorism, China-watching has become the major foreign-affairs interest in the legislative branch of the US government, both within long-established agencies with broad missions and in those that were formed more recently for a China-related purpose.
Thus, over the past decade, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service (CRS) have churned out a plethora of reports for Congress on US-China political and trade issues.
Also, since they were established by Congress in 2000, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission have both convened numerous hearings and provided annual reports to Congress, respectively, on human rights in China and China's development of the rule of law, and the national security implications of the US-China trade and economic relationship.
Aside from these legislative-branch agencies, there are five groups within Congress itself that are involved in US-China-related activities. In chronological order of formation, they are the House US-China Inter-parliamentary Exchange - 1999; the Senate US-China Inter-parliamentary Exchange - 2004; the Congressional China Caucus - mid-June 2005; the US-China Congressional Working Group - late June of 2005; and finally, the US-China Senate Working Group - 2006. All of these groups are bipartisan in their memberships.
For fear of overwhelming the reader with details about all seven entities, all I will say here about the GAO and CRS is that their activities have been described in great detail elsewhere. I also will not comment in depth on three of the five in-house congressional groups. Thus the House and Senate Inter-parliamentary Exchanges work with China's National People's Congress to arrange meetings in the US and China between members of the two congresses.
The exchanges don't meet often, involve relatively small numbers of House and Senate members, and don't, as groups, evaluate or take positions on US-China-related issues. Although the Senate Working Group's mission is broader - it is intended to serve as a forum for discussing China's political, economic and military rise and how this affects US national interests - as the group was only recently formed, its doesn't really have a sufficient track record for evaluation, and it is too early to predict the direction it will take.
This leaves us with the China Congressional Caucus and the US-China House Working Group, to date the most active and probably best known of the five in-Congress entities. Both of these groups have relatively large and expanding memberships - at last count, 35 for the caucus and 40 for the working group, with at least nine members belonging to both.
Congressmen Randy Forbes (a Republican from Virginia) and Ike Skelton (a Democrat from Missouri ) formed the China Caucus not long after they returned from a congressional trip that Forbes led to China early last year. Forbes was both greatly impressed and concerned by what he saw first-hand of China's rapid economic and military development.
He was particularly concerned about China's knowing far more about the US than the US knew about China, its rapidly growing number of engineers, its intellectual-property theft, its huge trade surplus with the United States, and its quickly expanding energy needs.
Furthermore, when Forbes returned and looked into federal-agency analysis of US-China-relations issues, he was displeased to find that neither the executive branch nor Congress had mechanisms in place that allowed for comprehensive analysis of how the US should deal with this supercharged China.
In his view, US-China issues primarily were being resolved in a stovepiped, agency-by-agency manner, and the agency analyses that did exist were poorly done.
As a consequence, Forbes and Skelton established the China Caucus for the purpose of having a congressional body that could make comprehensive analyses of US-China-relations issues. This includes evaluating the pluses and minuses of policy choices and stimulating a debate within the executive branch and Congress about how to deal with China.
The caucus meets regularly, holds briefings with China experts both within and outside the US government, and has discussions with Chinese Embassy officials, though it has few direct contacts with Chinese ministries. Caucus members tend to break into groups consistent with their areas of expertise. For example, Congressman Frank Wolf focuses on human-rights issues.
Perhaps in response to media assertions that the caucus is only security-oriented, Forbes stressed that the caucus looked at all areas of US-China relations, including trade, health care, environmental cooperation, human rights, the one-child policy and even differences in psychology between the two countries.
Nevertheless, the caucus also does weigh in heavily on security concerns. Among them, Forbes has identified China's military modernization, including its increased military expenditures; its high-tech shipbuilding capabilities, which would allow it to repair military ships quickly in the event of a conflict; military theft; and industrial espionage. Forbes also emphasized that the caucus is neither pro- nor anti-China.
Although the House US-China Working Group was formed soon after the China Caucus, Congressmen Mark Kirk (a Republican from Illinois) and Rick Larsen (a Democrat from Washington), founders and current co-chairs, both denied that the working group was intended to operate as a counterpoise to the caucus.
Rather, the working group was established primarily for educating congressional members about US-China-relations issues and for promoting in-depth discussions of these issues away from the floor of the House. Kirk emphasized that this process would help members develop better-nuanced, more sophisticated views about how US-China problems can be resolved.
The working group does not have any particular litmus test for membership and includes pro-China and anti-China members. Furthermore, the group itself does not take positions on the major US-China issues of the day.
Like the caucus, the working group convenes regularly, though not pursuant to a formal meeting schedule, and meets often with executive-branch officials, China experts, business representatives, and the Chinese Embassy in Washington.
The working group has also formed academic and business advisory groups through which academic and business experts provide advice on issues of interest to the group. Examples of working-group activities over the past year include a classified briefing with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, several meetings with Chinese Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong, and a meeting with Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez.
Although the group does not have formal contacts with Chinese officials not located in Washington, DC, when the opportunity presents itself group members do meet with Chinese officials, either in DC or in Beijing. For example, both Kirk and Larsen were among six members of Congress, including Forbes, who met privately with President Hu Jintao on his recent summit visit to the United States.
Kirk and Larsen informed this writer that the working group evaluated a broad spectrum of US-China political, economic, military and cultural issues. Nevertheless, the group tends to focus on issues where there are possibilities for immediate resolution, in contrast to larger, long-term problems, such as Taiwan and alleged currency manipulation, which are more difficult to resolve and attract more public attention.
For example, the working group currently is interested in promoting greater US-China cooperation in space, including joint rescue missions; development of common third-generation wireless standards; and independent audit of fully licensed software used by the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises as a way of lessening piracy of US software products.
In the security area, the working group supports establishing a US-China military-to-military phone line, a kind of insurance check that the US has with more than 20 countries, and increasing military-to-military exchanges of senior, junior and mid-level officers to increase transparency and allay inter-military suspicions and distrust.
Indeed, on security issues, Larsen believes that he and Forbes have shared concerns, notably about China's military intentions and the lack of transparency about those intentions. In this regard, Larsen told this writer he had been skeptical of answers given to him by Chinese officials with whom he had discussed security issues. This common concern predictably will be heightened by observations in the Department of Defense's (DoD's) recent report to Congress, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China", about the lack of transparency in China's military buildup.
From talk to legislative recommendations
Although both the caucus and the working group address a broad range of issues, they differ in their approach to making legislative recommendations. The caucus is putting together legislation - a "National Strategic Staffing Proposal" - which will be based, to some extent, on a recommendation in this year's Quadrennial Defense Review calling for the DoD to establish a National Security Planning Guidance that would replace DoD-centric with interagency approaches for resolving security challenges.
This China-based legislation will establish a new entity - not a new agency - in the executive branch that would allow federal agencies to deal comprehensively with US-China problems. To facilitate retention of employees with expertise on evaluating these problems, this entity is intended to be composed of staff who will be provided with strong career opportunities. The legislation is still being drafted and Forbes couldn't estimate when he will introduce it.
In contrast, Larsen said that, at least for the present, the working group does not plan to make legislative proposals as a group, though members might introduce bills in their individual capacity.
As an example, Larsen mentioned HR 5199, the "United States-China Engagement Act of 2006", which both he and Kirk recently introduced. The bill calls for enhancing the United States' role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group - strengthening the US diplomatic presence in China and increasing Chinese-language and cultural studies in US elementary and secondary schools.
Forbes, Kirk and Larsen all emphasized that their groups were neutral about China, yet there are notable differences in their perceptions of the country.
In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, provided soon after he formed the Congressional Caucus, Forbes analogized China's quick emergence on the world stage to the giant shark in the movie Jaws suddenly leaping from the water to grab bait the local sheriff had casually tossed from his boat.
Moreover, as an example of the poor coordination Forbes believes exists among US agencies that deal with China problems - in this case the State Department, the DoD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation - Forbes cited the espionage potential raised by large numbers of Chinese coming to the United States for study.
According to Forbes, some of these students have remained behind, infiltrated defense-contractor firms, stolen their industrial secrets and provided them to China.
Also, last year Forbes spearheaded the congressional charge that led to passage of a House resolution criticizing the China National Offshore Oil Co's proposed purchase of the US oil company Unocal. This congressional opposition to the deal was a major factor in CNOOC's decision to abandon its offer. Aside from Forbes, 30 of the other 35 members of the Congressional Caucus voted for the resolution, with only one member of the caucus voting against.
Congressman Forbes' unflattering comparison of China to a killer shark, raising the old bugaboo of espionage, and, perhaps, overreacting to energy-security concerns, do raise questions about both his and the caucus's objectivity about China.
Also, Forbes' real interest in China only began in January 2005 during the first trip - a relatively short visit - that he ever took there. While a fresh look at a problem can be quite valuable, it may be imprudent to put too much faith in someone without an earned track record on US-China issues.
In this regard, Forbes' point about the executive branch not always coordinating its policies on how to deal with China seems substantially overstated. Aside from the US Trade Representative-led Trade Policy Subcommittee, which includes numerous federal agencies that regularly meet to discuss US-China trade issues, the National Security Council, the State Department, DoD and the intelligence agencies do coordinate on US-China political and military issues as they arise.
As for the working group and its leaders, Kirk and Larsen have been criticized for being cheerleaders for China, to a great extent because of their both having companies in their districts - respectively, Boeing and Motorola, and Boeing - which are on the A-list of businesses that have done very well in the China market. Also, Larsen's comment to this writer, "Shouldn't we be doing everything possible not to have a conflict with China rather than only prepare for a conflict?" sounds a bit heavy on the deference side.
Though even China hawks would probably disagree that only preparing for a conflict with China is sound policy, one would think that avoiding any behavior that China might view as confrontational would also not be in the United States' best national interests.
Nevertheless, Kirk's and Larsen's emphasis on a small-step, careful (touch the stones as you cross the river) long-term approach to resolving problems with China seems like most reasonable one.
Given a choice between this approach and the more fear-driven, in-your-face stance, I certainly would go with the former. Indeed, Kirk and Larsen were only two of 15 congressmen who voted against the House resolution criticizing CNOOC's proposed purchase of Unocal.
Kirk suggested that a number of House members voting for the resolution were shooting from the hip in condemning the deal and were not familiar with the facts. For example, they mistakenly believed that Unocal operated many gasoline stations in the US.
Also, while Kirk and Larsen may not have been certified China hands before they formed the working group, they both have backgrounds that offered some preparation for leading a group focusing on relations with China. Before being elected to Congress, Kirk had substantial experience in international affairs at the World Bank and the State Department, and Larsen hails from a state that has had both an important and continuing relationship with China, and, in Henry "Scoop" Jackson and Warren Magnuson, late senators with formidable records on US-China-relations issues.
As for the recent summit between presidents George W Bush and Hu Jintao, Forbes and Larsen agreed that the meeting was valuable in providing the two leaders some face time together, despite the lack of concrete deliverables.
While Forbes, Kirk and Larsen were all part of the six-member congressional group that meet privately with Hu, media accounts suggested that only Forbes confronted Hu. Both at that meeting and later in a publicly announced formal request, Forbes asked the Chinese president whether he would permit him "to lead a congressional delegation to China that would have unfettered and unrestricted access to Christian groups in China". Kirk and Larsen seemed to take a more low-key approach.
Only time will tell whether the proliferation of China groups in Congress will help or impede analyses of US-China relations issues. There is no question that deepening interest in and expertise about China can be of great value, and some of the legislative proposals that members of the China Caucus and the US-China Congressional Working Group promote could have beneficial consequences.
Thus Forbes' staffing proposal, despite this writer's doubts, could well improve interagency coordination of China issues, and Kirk's and Larsen's support for greater Chinese instruction in US schools is definitely a step in the right direction.
Nevertheless, part of the congressional rush to form so many China-based groups could well reflect oversensitivity to a perceived threat from China. Of course, this has happened before. Congressional fear-mongering about Japanese economic power in the 1970s and 1980s, and more recent executive-branch exaggeration of the threats posed by Iraq, are just two familiar examples.
The problem the United States has had in rushing to judgment in the area of foreign relations counsels well for the slow, step-by-step, reasoned approach suggested by Larsen. This is particularly true when dealing with a country like China, whose economic, social and even some political development over the past 27 years, generally, has been positive.
Richard Seldin is a senior legal consultant and freelance writer.
(Copyright 2006 Richard Seldin.)